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Abstract: Usually, Zhuangzi’s parable of “the butterfly dream/dreaming butterfly” is read 
as an enigmatic version, from “the East”, of the Cartesian skeptical challenges to 
“objective reality” or else the Lacanian psycho-drama of the “pure gaze” in which “he”, 
Zhuangzi, “is a butterfly for nobody”, who stands for “the Real”. Retooling some of the 
critical insights from these standard dialectical or anxiogenic approaches to this allegorical 
puzzle of self-identity, both of which, however, tend to leave unquestioned or else 
structurally overrate the binarized inner-exclusivity of typical pairs such as in/out, 
subject/object, illusion/reality, and all/nothing, this article proposes a relatively novel, fluid 
model of unraveling the speculative knot, the dots of lepidopterological spacetime 
irreducible to a simpler “point” in space and time. As we follow the narrative sequence 
more micro- and macrologically at once, with holistic, philopoetic attention to its intricate 
conceptual cues and contextual clues, especially its streaks and energies of “oppositional 
poetics” envisaged by Anne Waldman, for instance, we come to see more clearly the  
trans-categorical auto-generativity of its modal openness, its oddly powerful, non-militarily 
propelled, avant-garde peripherality. As Zhuangzi’s butterfly gets freed this way from the 
discursive net where it is lost and found (often instantly dead), the vocalized figure of the 
“irritating” narrator, too, will change more freely, flying in and out and back in 
“daoistically” rather than agonistically. 
Keywords: Zhuangzi; René Descartes; Jacques Lacan; Anne Waldman; dream; poetics; 
philopoetics; butterfly dream; freedom; Dao 
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For Helen-Butterfly, 
who said she would come read Zhuangzi with me 
next time  
we could get together1 
Once Zhuangzi dreamt he was a butterfly, a butterfly flitting and fluttering around, happy 
with himself and doing as he pleased. He didn’t know he was Zhuangzi. Suddenly he woke 
up and there he was, solid and unmistakable Zhuangzi. But he didn’t know if he was 
Zhuangzi who had dreamt he was a butterfly, or a butterfly dreaming he was Zhuangzi. 
Between Zhuangzi and a butterfly there must be some distinction! This is called the 
Transformation of Things [1,2] (Z 2:20, emphasis added). 
1. A Butterfly and a Child Thinking Inter Alia: “Once Zhuangzi Dreamt…” 
Many a reader will have at least passing familiarity with this parable of “butterfly dreaming” (夢蝶, 
mèngdié Z 2: 20) from Zhuangzi (莊子). The chiasmatic figure here of the butterfly-dreamer and/or the 
dreaming butterfly, in itself, also embodies the bohemian life and character of this ancient Daoist 
intellectual, Zhuangzi (莊子, 369–298 BCE) who, not unlike Diogenes of Sinope (412/404–323 BCE), 
stayed away from office politics, practically the office itself. This image of a butterfly 
dreamer/dreaming butterfly seems to capture rather perfectly Zhuangzi’s free and freely recyclable 
spirit—a cocktail of aesthetic anarchism, ethical passivism, literary surrealism, philosophical 
relativism, poetic skepticism, political cynicism, metaphysical agnosticism, and so on, bordering on 
obscurantism or mysticism: Is that all? Is Zhuangzi an escapist? A hippie-happy idler (good for, if not 
nothing, at least some thing such as no-thing)? 
I think not. Something else seems to be going on, somewhere else in this text, on this very site; 
something more, something different, even deviant or fugitive at times, but in any case, something 
more or less than a case encasable as such. Below, let me try to show what else I seem to see in this 
picture: how exactly is Zhuangzi or Zhuangzi (the text) free, and free from what exactly? 
“Once, Zhuangzi (or Formerly, I, Zhuangzi) [3]…”, the passage begins. Strictly speaking, we do not 
actually know who the narrator is or where he or she is, and such is and should be, as I will show,  
the starting point. Zhuangzi mentions Zhuangzi and Zhuangzi uses Zhuangzi. Here, this usual  
use-mention distinction, a foundational axiom or modal imperative in certain “analytic” camps of 
philosophy, is staged, performed, rather than simply observed or noted: The modal difference is 
playfully teased out, and Zhuangzi/Zhuangzi eased out, without being ignored. Is Zhuangzi here the 
former I or the present I, or both, or neither? The answer seems bloody unclear, especially as the text 
simply repeats the name “Zhuangzi” without identifying or equating it as an “I” anywhere in the 
paragraph. Here, hear what one totally exasperated philosopher has to say: 
The story of Zhuangzi and the butterfly must be one of the best known anecdotes in the 
philosophical literature. It is also, for me at any rate, one of the most annoying: the kind of 
philosophical whimsy that irritates rather than illuminates. But as is so often the case, it is 
																																																								
1 This paper is dedicated to Helen Tartar. 
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when we are walking away from philosophical problems that we realize that they point, 
however unsteadily, to something we cannot entirely dismiss [4]. 
Irritatingly illuminating: the question for me, for Raymond Tallis as well to a certain extent, becomes 
not so much whether to scratch the itch or walk away from it, as how to scratch it, how to walk with it, 
given that it is and is felt recurrently in the localized form of it be(com)ing itchy. As Sandra 
Wawrytko [5] observes: Zhuangzi-Butterfly, akin to Nietzsche-gadfly, is a kind of paralogical twin 
conjoined by the “both/and logic” that “deconstructs deconstruction”, the negative streak of 
deconstruction in particular. Note again: to deconstruct deconstruction, not something constructed: What 
could this reflexive repetition mean? What that conjunction does topologically—topoanalytically or 
topoanalogically—in Zhuangzi’s text is to play up material connectivity and associational continuity 
between beings while holding in view their mutual exclusivity, itself categorically maintained by the 
discursive differentiation of this-or-that, which is where “some distinction”, that gestural division and 
eventual discernment, takes place. Zhuangzi-Butterfly covers—embraces—itself, its own contradictions 
acutely, as it hovers around. 
The line of thinking Tallis pursues and draws typifies the “modern western philosophical”, 
particularly “analytic”, way of handling and controlling Zhuangzian self-differentiation, which 
remains, in my view, insufficiently analytic, although ten(ur)able. Shifting his focus to a more 
definitive if not defining or refined moment in this dream-thinking, Tallis privileges the independence 
of a perspective, an Archimedean standpoint. As he summates, just as a certain Descartes coming out 
of multiple Descartes would do when out to declare cogito sum: “The viewpoint is decisively his 
(Zhuangzi’s), and there is an undeclared assumption that the story is being told from outside of the 
dream, and indeed outside both the sage’s waking and dream states so that they can be compared and 
the pretense of equivalence teasingly advanced” [4]. Presumably then, as assumed, Zhuangzi becomes 
the “Cartesian” subject of reflection or at least a variant, e.g., one “pretending”, “teasing”, 
“advancing”, “playing along, knowingly”…who knows? Again, what’s the point—of it all? How else 
can we hold the line before handling it? Or/and more basically, why bother at all? 
Now I am looking at a point of divergent convergence, a web about to emerge. Here is how and 
where my thought parts from that philosopher’s. I, too, see the important heuristic function of the 
Zhuangzian riddle. As Tallis puts it succinctly, “some kind of skepticism, justifying an inquiry that 
enables us to question the all-too-obvious, the glass wall of our everyday thinking about everyday life, 
seems entirely in order” [4]; again, as the parable ends with this resounding reminder, there must be 
“some distinction” between (two) things usually taken for granted as part of the same, e.g., the 
dreaming I and the wakeful I as belonging to the “I”, in sum, of I think, I feel, I wonder, I imagine, etc. 
While Tallis and I share this big picture, i.e., the analogical point about the importance of critical 
philosophizing, a crucial detail in it also generates a bigger picture that we do not seem to share as 
readily: How should one read butterfly crossing, cruising even, within that very event of dreaming 
framed as such? Arriving? Leaving? Quivering? I am not going in or out anywhere, even with 
Zhuangzi-Butterfly, until and unless I can find a more satisfactory answer to that question. The point 
of fact I am focusing on is that the localized point of observation, articulated by Tallis on the 
discursive topos or perspectival fixity of Zhuangzi actually, immediately, unpredictably, almost totally, 
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turns into something else: it is also a point of connection or transition including transformative 
transgression, as in a dot. 
The usual, methodologically disembodied skepticism, characteristic of Descartes’ hyperbolic doubt, 
enters a world of vitalist rationalism and transcorporeal materialism too, where a perspective itself, 
with its innate topological fluidity and porosity, would grow and move around, while itself forming, a 
sort of electromagnetic dot that potentializes and activates things, all sorts of things, everything in 
transit(ion) inside and outside what we call or end up calling the world. What I have in mind, drawing 
in part on the life of René Descartes, the famous sleepyhead, along with my own life-long expertise as 
a never-an-A pupil, is something like the inner Descartes in all thinking things, the transitional child in 
bed, about to fall asleep or unready to get up, staring at some wallpaper patterns in the favorite corner 
or middle of the ceiling above, doing (her own) math in her head, dotting here and there in her world 
across her headspace, sometimes thinking something else, transported elsewhere [6]. The trick seems 
to be how to break open, while sheltering, those layers and glass walls of thinking, thinking that occurs 
without evidentiary traces or preset trajectories—a life and afterlife of serial (mental) defenestration. 
Note the threshold, the discursive code switch or, say, swerve, a sweeping or sliding move from 
Zhuangzi to Butterfly and vice versa, rather than just Zhuangzi 1 to Zhuangzi 2 or Zhuangzi 0, flattened 
and chopped up and processed with nothing boring or even exciting in between. In the Euclidean 
geometrical script almost automatically followed and fortified by disciplined thinkers such as Tallis 
who is advancing it, the solar circular irreducibility of the Cartesian presence of the reflective I is at 
once established and premised upon an anchored gaze “outside” the speculative muddle in the middle 
which, in my view, is what Zhuangzi 0 would be like: neither some white vessel nor a black hole but 
something composite, a dense, gray, gooey matter that trembles; this seems also how the brain-in-a-vat 
skeptics can be liberated from—survive—their own speculative swamp or abyss, their empty nest or 
vest. I am reminded of the middle of/muddle in “a house besieged,” as writer Lydia Davis envisages it: 
In a house besieged lived a man and a woman. From where they cowered in the kitchen the 
man and woman heard small explosions. “The wind”, said the woman. “Hunters”, said the 
man. “The rain”, said the woman. “The army”, said the man. The woman wanted to go home, 
but she was already home, there in the middle of the country in a house besieged [7]. 
The (muddled) middle being where things overlap while separated, such as a wall or a threshold 
between 11:59 and midnight, it or “it” becomes a portable allegory of life in itself; “man’s life  
has always been a muddle like this. How could I be the only muddled one, and other men not 
muddled?” (Z 2: 3). That much seems clear, breathtakingly simple, however surreal—also to 
Zhuangzi. Then again, one wonders: Who is (the) one outside “a”/the/this/that “house besieged”? 
The subject returns—to the scene. Sure, when she wants to go home, she wants to go home: simple 
as that, we get that. Yet again, along the way, we still need to try and figure out where that “home” is 
and who that is: not just the zero-point of thinking, but more closely, incisively, a zero-degree 
thinking, writing, reading…living…zero itself in transit. 
Recall the bifocality of the opening call, “Once Zhuangzi dreamt (Formerly, I, Zhuangzi …)”, while 
attending, this time, to the contextual temporality of the inaugural sequence: it seems equally unclear 
how that “decision” (of who is in or out, narrating this allegory), not to mention intention, could be set 
by Tallis or Zhuangzi himself or anyone else; where the agent is or what the goal is, one has little idea. 
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If Zhuangzi is speaking of himself who is also Zhuangzi, given the very possibility of the former 
Zhuangzi being a butterfly dreaming of Zhuangzi, as the tale goes, the identity, ontological or 
otherwise, of the present Zhuangzi cannot be established as such, either. If anything, the least we could 
say might come down to this, last one perhaps: Zhuangzi or the storytelling butterfly, the double 
switchboard operator, is passing by as a dis/identity marker without showing himself or itself per se. 
As Hans-Georg Moeller notes: 
The non-present narrator of the story neglects neither being awake nor dreaming, neither 
life nor death. To him, all present segments are equally valid and authentic. Even if he no 
longer identifies himself with any particular segment, this is by no means negated or 
falsified by non-presence: on the contrary, it is balanced or held up by non-present. So just 
as the narrator does not deny or falsify the validity of a Zhuang Zhou or the butterfly, 
Daoist non-presence does not deny or falsify the validity of the present. In this sense, 
Daoism does not “relativize” (as it is sometimes proposed) the validity of present forms of 
being: the sage, while being non-present, rather affirms the realm or process of present 
with all its equal but distinct segments ([8], p. 445). 
“Held up by non-present”, “the non-present narrator” too becomes at every turn an ellipsis, a set of 
dots generating its own connective tissues each time. Quite simply, as folk wisdom would have it, 
shifting a perspective and expanding a horizon ever so slightly at times of crisis could free one, big 
time; connect this dot to another, or redraw the line in a different way, instead of treating each point or 
position as fixed, immobile, and autonomous, as some real estates of the ego. Move and move to a 
point you yourself could make, push open, even a tiny bit, but again in any case, holistically each time.  
If Zhuangzi’s Daoism does not “relativize” ontological or epistemological measures, what it does is to 
relate, to re-relate, making things count, everything, every single little thing, relevant to one another. 
What we learn and hear from this iconic Zhuangzi-Butterfly that also still profoundly chimes with  
the ethico-performative way-making tradition of Daoism, as Kai-Yuan Cheng stresses, is how to 
“relate” relationally, not just relatively or relativistically; “free association” through “leisurely 
wandering” (Z 1) becomes ontological, existential, and environmental, not just social, semantic, or mental. 
Take time. It takes time to see such lively-deadly differences emerging from a matrix of things, 
however minimal or insignificant or contingent or accidental or subtle or ethereal—all equally real at 
any rate, in the eyes of Zhuangzi-Butterfly. Often, departing from today that was tomorrow, one’s 
worldview changes, subtly or drastically, which would amount to the same. Self-differentiation 
becomes ordinary, expected at times. It is as if some space in the self, usually locked in, would get 
“freed” up as time goes by; or maybe selfhood, too, flies—somehow, somewhere—with time. How 
freely does one change, getting “transformed”? Again, Zhuangzi-Butterfly holds the key without 
holding onto it, so to speak. And how would that Mobius pair free one: you and me, us, them? 
Before we get (to) freedom, I want to spend some more time trying to figure out what cements a 
point and a dot in the first place. We need to free up, to defragment, that field of elasticity before we 
can complete the paradigmatic conversion or translation between the two. In other words, what else is 
a dream-thought that lasts? How else does thinking release, disperse, give up, or randomize its own-ness 
without losing its plot or steam or stream? Where does the cogito find its bedfellow(s) or incubator(s)? 
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2. A Child and a Puppet Reading inter alia: “He was a Butterfly” 
Read what Jacques Lacan says about dreaming as reading: “In dreams, for example, we are quite 
capable of having the feeling of reading something, whereas, obviously, we can’t claim that there is 
any correspondence with a signifier” (emphasis added) [9]. Dreaming is feeling; it feels like reading, 
with the active-passive-aggressive-dormant dreamer-reader-watcher(s) inside/outside the cinematic 
frame as the scenes roll by. Like a reader bolted to a text that unfolds toward and “refolds” its own cliff 
at every turn [10], the dreamer in a dream would sometimes face the death of the dreamer herself or a 
fatal crash that seems to crush everything, everyone, every one of us transported into & out of that 
dreamscape including nightmares. 
All that is far from “free”, some might say. Right. Every now and then, dreamwork offers or propels 
some temporary madness, a psychic relief of and from altered realities, sweet or sweaty or mixed as in 
mixed feelings—especially if we, everyday Cartesian-Zhuangzian sleeper-dreamers, can say “upon 
waking” that, well, there must be “some distinction”, however elusive or effusive, some-thing or one 
other than just me in me. Right there, this time, with Lacan reading his way through Daniel Paul 
Schreber’s (1842–1911) memoir, with some “Secretaries to the Insane,” the title of his Seminar XVI 
(1956) on the schizophrenic “little man”, we catch a glimpse across the persistent polarity of the life of 
“ego”, ironically stabilized by the “secretary” who reads, who is not exactly the same as the Hegelian 
slave who, in any ideally revolutionary historical context, would eventually become the master, or at 
least work with a view to becoming that. Rather, in Lacanian terms, this abyssal power differential 
between the unreadable boss and the studious secretary reflects the disjunctively functional or, 
creatively messed-up/mixed-in, sexy/sexuated/sexualized [11] relationship between “the Other,” the 
symbolic, unidentifiable-fied X, and “the other,” the imaginary this or that mis/identified-able as such: 
We get the impression that it’s insofar as he hasn’t acquired or has lost this Other that he 
encounters the purely imaginary other, the fallen and meager other with whom he is not 
able to have any relations except relations of frustration—this other negates him, literally 
kills him. This other is that which is most radical in imaginary alienation. 
Now, this capture by the double is correlative of the appearance of what can be called the 
permanent discourse that underlies the inscription of what takes place over the course of 
the subject’s history and doubles all his acts. It isn’t impossible, moreover, to see the 
discourse emerge in a normal subject ([9], p. 209). 
The invisibly operative, symbolic, anxiogenic “father” of the everyday little man is, again for 
Lacan, the functionary generator of schizophrenia, mundane or murderous, and the distinction itself, 
while there, becomes obscure due to its hyper-normal near-universality and permanence. The structural 
reach and force of these “double” discourses or layers or standards of the other vis-à-vis Other as well 
as the other/Other vis-à-vis one, constitutive of the phenomenal realities of the ego thus dictated and 
performed, is illustrated in this well-known passage, where Lacan theorizes the other/Other in 
straightforward terms, drawing derivatively/deviantly on the Hegelian idioms of dialectical reciprocity: 
Who normally speaks in reality, for us? Is it reality, exactly, when someone speaks to us? 
The point of the remarks I made to you last time on the other and the Other, the other with 
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a small o and the Other with a big O, was to get you to notice that when the Other with a 
big O speaks it is not purely and simply the reality in front of you, namely the individual 
who is holding forth. The Other is beyond that reality. 
In true speech the Other is that before which you make yourself recognized. But you can 
make yourself recognized by it only because it is recognized first…This supplementary 
dimension—the reciprocity—is necessary for there to be any value in this speech…You 
are my master or You are my woman…It is through recognizing it that you institute it, and 
not as a pure and simple element of reality, a pawn, a puppet, but an irreducible absolute, 
on whose existence as subject the very value of the speech in which you get yourself 
recognized depends. Something gets born there. 
In other words, wherever a puppet talks it’s not the puppet that talks, but it’s someone  
behind it [12]. 
Digressing further, am I? What happened to that ancient idea of “freedom,” with which we started 
our mini-journey? What has Zhuangzi’s butterfly, an emblem of Daoist freedom, to do with Lacan’s 
puppet, a figure of psychoanalytic subjection and, further back, dreaming as reading? 
The butterfly is linkable, though not equatable, to that “irreducible absolute”, the puppet master,  
the radical, necessary fiction in the specular and speculative world of Lacanian parallelism and 
allegorical paternalism, where ultimately “the Father” rules, justly or not. The genius of Lacan’s model, 
the kind of psychoanalytic dynamism harder to detect in Tallis’s more reductive analysis or the 
Hegelian-Marxist traditions of dialectical thinking broadly conceived, is in its structural double 
reading, pattern-recognition, of a certain micro- and macroscopic traffic, asymmetrical reciprocity, 
between one and the other, or the other and the Other: Lacan makes the two relate to each other by 
bringing the “outside” gaze in, by drawing the Other “beyond” or “behind” or “before” “(that) reality” 
into the semiologico-scopic field, by having it first activated, mobilized, by the puppet-like other even 
when the Master Other is, inevitably, withdrawing to its own heart of privileged darkness, the unreadable. 
And then there seems another sort of other/Other, which Lacan’s post-Hegelian other or Other does 
not seem to catch entirely or care about much. Here, I do not mean to evoke some overcapitalized 
rhetoric of East-West untranslatability or universalized transcendental or cosmic ineffability. Rather, 
the other sense of the other rising here I am trying to raise my consciousness to is conceptual, 
transhistorical, almost transtemporal: if the fly is not quite the other or Other or even the one to catch, 
but rather one among many, “ten thousand”, as the classical Chinese idiom would go, I am interested 
to follow the movements of that other—not Ur and the Über—butterfly or puppet that stops or 
stabilizes the infinite regressing of buttery flying and puppeteering itself, again, in a way not resorting 
to a dialecticized absolutism or ontological monism. Where would its discontinuous identities unfurl or 
coagulate, or how would one spot it among 10,000 singular-plurals? 
Lodged in the proto-Cartesian-Lacanian thinking thing (res cogitans) that is something other than 
other or Other, with the two still held apart distinctly if not clearly, is a flying allegorical “sobject…a 
perpetual procedural loop” or “substantive eclipse” of subjectivity and objectivity [13]; as seen earlier, 
it is found trapped (sort of) alive in the child lying in bed, that coffin simulator, daydreaming, virtually 
somnambulating, sometimes sobbing over what happened, what matters, fantasizing at times about 
what might be coming or not. Through such a figure moved to think as if for the first time, I should 
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like to repeat this dream question just once more: what is it that connects and disconnects Zhuangzi’s 
butterfly and Lacan’s puppet? What makes them associate or dissociate? What catalyzes, not just 
analyzes, their association and dissociation? What is one, this third one, that runs, races, rushes 
through the two? How to dot spacetime freely, infinitely, alternatively, singularly, anew, as if for the 
first time in the childhood of the mindbody: that is the question I continue to follow in what follows. 
3. Living through Butterfly Awakening, Spacing: “A Butterfly Fluttering about, Happy...” 
There is a path in an empty space as well. That is where Butterflies fly along. It is called a 
butterfly route. As long as you are equipped with wings, you can use it. Bypassing a  
two-dimensional world, you go three-dimensional [14]. 
The butterfly & the flower are not a duo, and life-death & dream not apart [15]. 
What does a butterfly do? It flies…and what follows? Its “fluttering about” (栩栩, xǔxǔ) creates its 
own fore/backgrounds and nominal traces (Z 1: 6) along the way; its “butterfly route” (蝶道 dié 
dào)—not just an effect—like its dao (way, path, route, track, method, technique), unfolds like a cat’s 
cradle gone wilder, frameless, viral. To think of, while away, a-way, with a butterfly flying  
away along its own silky dreamy route, is to think—go vectorial, manifold; to track and crack the 
cross-sectional, soft disjunctivity of its transitory appearance as well as disappearance. 
Following a butterfly around, while backtracking some fortuitous itinerary of the butterfly crossing 
itself, one gets closer to a vital matter—of life and death—that auto-creates flight paths. As trivial as it 
may sound, truly enough, anything—any thing, body, one—that moves makes its own way in or out, in 
and out, auto-spacing, interacting with the environment it engages, all then subject to the laws of 
transformation. When pipe-dreamers and armchair adventurers, fighting a battle in a teacup, think and 
talk of a butterfly in some imaginary glassy box, of and through which Zhuangzi, too, speaks with the 
allegorical concision of a hermit warrior, one (especially philosophers including failed poets) should 
try to re-member the double seminal productivity of all the (hidden, obvious, cosmic, and cosmetic) 
details: the sky in the background [16], for instance, to begin with. In other words, as the “flight of the 
butterflies is governed by ‘the conspiring elements—winds and scents, foliage and sun’ (SW III, 
350)…the elements come together through some secret plan, of which the butterfly becomes the 
image” [17]; it is no longer then a secret that there is also the wind that takes it, not to mention the 
window through which to view, which will frame the dust in the wind taking us to “the fog” [18] 
above a lake that would unfold around the corner of some California “highway” [19], with fellow 
microbes in the field, on board. 
Follow, also, the dots in the night sky that “connects the heaven and the earth” [20], a universe in a 
university folded in one of those stars…for indeed, again, to begin with: “There is a series of rooms. 
Each room frames a table, a book and an opening to the outside—an aperture of some sort” [21] 
inhabited also by the “wide slumbering lepidopterists” [22] who would or will have at least once 
thought twice that “so we dream the same (left page) do we dream the same (right page)” [22] in their 
“festive dreams” [23], those dreams dreamt in a Cartesian-Bachelardian [24]-Lacanian corner room, in 
the curvature of our embodied or ensouled existence, where beings sprout, moving about with the 
relative ease and itemized vitality of “the little child just sitting in the snow” [25], the child so carefree 
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as not to appear to be even wishing or intending to be free, no matter what, no matter whatever sort of 
other/Other is out there or in here. So what I am dreaming thereof with philopoet children are, just to list 
the first two for now: Christmas every other day so that we can remember to look forward to it, and, if 
possible, wanjun-byuntae (a complete metamorphosis/total perversion, 완전변태, 完 全 變 態 , a 
polysemic Sino-Korean interlingual pun in Korean, the title of Oisoo Lee’s fiction cited above). 
The intertextual portability as well as universal probability of Zhuangzian performative irony and  
its sobering twists and turns remain potent this way, more vibrant, extensive, intriguing, unwieldy than 
the usual, neat (“Oriental” or “Eastern”) package it comes in. To repeat: the dreaming butterfly would 
and should not care about “me” or “you”, but, more simply, mind her own business or dreams, doing 
her own thing every time she flies or not. See, “though the cook may not run his kitchen properly, the 
priest and the impersonator of the dead at the sacrifice do not leap over the wine casks and sacrificial 
stands and go take his place” (Z 1:7): This Zhuangzian version of ‘minding one’s own business’ also 
illustrates an art of active inaction (無爲, wuwei) that respects material tautology, leaving the done 
done, undone undone, dead dead; of associating beings with beings or non-beings without forcing them 
into the boxy geometry of a relationship per se. To wit: just know that a butterfly flies when it does. 
Turning “back to the things themselves” or themself, the phenomenal singularities of each and 
every (10,000) thing, I am interested to think further via Zhuangzi-Butterfly itself and the dotted 
singularities of its movements: how to register its near-literal, irreducibly allegorical materialities, not 
just its analogical values or discursive functions; how to unpack that autopoetic space or aviational 
void repeatedly, every time differently; how to follow its living logic, its vital-viral forces carried in 
the butterfly zone, including the body so transportable and transported. 
Again, we start with the arguably simplest fact that the butterfly flies in and out, and away, and at 
the end of the day, it is and no longer is a flying object, a body. We could replace it with “the 
short-lived cicada” that “does not know (what takes place between) the spring and autumn” (Z 1:4), or 
replace the cicada with you, and me, who do not know what takes place between today and tomorrow. 
Butterflies “R” Us, perhaps. In this scene of elastic fugitivity and layered vectoriality, the thinker, the 
self-reading sobject thingy, becomes like Walter Benjamin’s “untidy (animal-scientist) child (my 
insertion)” in Berlin chasing around a butterfly, a child whose “life is like a dream”, who would also 
capture and miss X, just standing there, staring into the void, mini-petrified by what (could not have) 
happened [26]. Here lies an allegory of cutting-edge thinking, a dialectical image of associative death 
about to enter nature or nature about to escape capture: 
In a dream, he is a butterfly. What does this mean? It means that he sees the butterfly in his 
reality as gaze. What are so many figures, so many shapes, so many colors, if not this 
gratuitous showing, in which is marked for us the primal nature of the essence of the gaze. 
…He is a captive butterfly, but captured by nothing, for, in the dream, he is a butterfly for 
nobody. It is when he is awake that he is Choang-tsu for others, and is caught in their 
butterfly net [27]. 
Thus spake Lacan, who sees nobody around that butterfly, all those other invisible bodies, an-other 
10,000 folded into the background (gaze) of the Lacanian square, square root zero. Where is the body 
in all these? Gone where? The child in the snow wonders, bringing out her foldable bed from her 
backpack, ready to wander with Alice. So, Uncle Jacques, I too see the trouble, possibly half-yours.
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4. A Philopoetics of Butterfly Redreaming: “Called a Transformation of Things” 
I am not thinking of Death, but Death is thinking of me.  
He leans back in his chair, rubs his hands, strokes  
His beard and says, “I’m thinking of Strand, I’m thinking  
That one of these days I’ll be out back, swinging my scythe  
Or holding my hourglass up to the moon, and Strand will appear  
In a jacket and tie, and together under the boulevards’  
Leafless trees we’ll stroll into the city of souls. And when  
We get to the Great Piazza with its marble mansions, the crowd  
That had been waiting there will welcome us with delirious cries,  
And their tears, turned hard and cold as glass from having been  
Held back so long, will fall, and clatter on the stones below.  
O let it be soon. Let it be soon. 
—Mark Strand, “2002” [28]. 
Reenter a butterfly dreamscape, through a nightmare if unavoidable, and, whatever the case, reclaim 
the present by re-dreaming as necessary—by reading one by one, step by step, nice and slow, fast to 
the core, skimming, not just scanning, words from the surface of self-liquidating realities, traces called 
history or story or so-called theory whose pretension is an intention to be outside history or story [29]. 
“How do we now navigate a new chaos of possibility?” [30]: Not just a possibility but more 
precisely a chaos of, the visionary poet Anne Waldman asks. As with Alice in Wonderland, whose 
boredom is a protest of this uninteresting being against that being engaged otherwise, this sort of 
perpetualized struggle for and against becoming-otherwise, namely the tactical self-retardation or 
acceleration of a wonder-wanderer à la Zhuangzi, might just be what we need at this point, or perhaps 
all we could do minimally. To paraphrase Waldman’s millennial call for a sort of philopoetic activism 
in the age of post-Cartesian techno-commodification of self(ie)hood, the question is not exactly how to 
rebuild the think/dream-work/sleep-live/die-on/off modern binary super-machine now almost exhausted 
by self-consuming postmodernist discourses, but rather how to keep the dreamer awake or keep the 
awake dreaming more simply, organically, freely, especially among all this often suffocating  
“i-(mediated-small-but-fancy)-stuff” in the sprawling “Internet of things” nowadays, part of “Indra’s 
net” of the empty universe as rooted and distant as Mahayana Buddhism of the third century. Save the 
philo-poet and the poet philosopher in our midst, who are nodding off with us, breathing with us in the 
24/7 fresh air of capitalist somnambulism. Turning to this “buttery”, netty, tricky part(ner) of “me”, me 
that might become clearer when data-mined and qualified by quantity, I read on: 
remember: no rules. 
Poetry keeps changing its stress 
and we might live more in our 
dreams than in this dangerous 
walking life, or not [31]. 
“No, never sleep” [30], whether in that sweet dream or in this dreadful diary, as the coupled 
distinction itself becomes increasingly unclear. Instead, keep the other eye half open/closed across time 
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during this life-death moment at which sleeping, dreaming, thinking, reading, writing are all one of 
many things one does in tune with the performative tautology of spacetime weaving its way into and 
out of itself—as if awake all the time, even or especially while asleep. “You must go against the grain 
for the benefit of others. As the Muse said to Hilda Doolittle, ‘Write. Write or die’.” [30]—also 
meaning, Write and Die? As in, write when you write, “die when you die” [32], yes? 
So be “rattled” [33], says a poet, not settled, in this long dream redreamt every now and then; have 
the bowl of your mind turned inside out, upside down, recall the tremor, the clamor, tiny or slippery, it 
does not matter, and even better. Such a poetical gesture of otherworldly worldly vigil, rhyming with 
phenomenological awakening, an almost spiritual alternative to “planetary finitude” [30], epochal 
closures, world-historical complacencies and conflicts and calamities would keep nourished and 
energized the extra-horizonal other, the sort of third other, to be sheltered with uncountable oddballs 
and queer fugitives often counted on by countless unpaired alter egos and organisms of the universe. 
This sort of “oppositional poetics,” which Waldman dares to name with unfussy clarity, is what keeps 
the—or at least this—philosopher going, although relatively gingerly. Read on, thinkingly, as long as 
the interval allows—and pass it onto unknown and unknowing others as freely, givingly, as possible. 
5. Back to Conclusions 
“It”? I am dreaming a dream, thinking a thought of lateral, incisively inclusionary, middle-covering, 
muddle-exposing thinking across and among multitudes, planes, categories, boundaries, horizons; I am 
entertaining a proto-phenomenological vision of the infinite tapestry of oneness and openness, both 
cogitational and ontological. 
So in short, here we are, I have come to see and am trying to show in “sum” ways Zhuangzi’s 
parable of “the butterfly dream/dreaming butterfly” from a richer, onto-phenomenologically relational 
and materialist perspective; again in “sum” ways, we already know fairly well its rhetorical 
exemplarity as an example of the Cartesian skeptical challenges to “objective reality” or the Lacanian 
psycho-drama of the “pure gaze” in which “he”, Zhuangzi, “is a butterfly for nobody”, who stands for 
“the Real”. Both frames, while helpful as scaffolds, as I highlighted above, tend to leave unquestioned 
or else structurally overrate the binarized inner-exclusivity of typical pairs such as in/out, 
subject/object, illusion/reality, and all/nothing. Instead, my line of reading explores a relatively novel, 
fluid model of unraveling the speculative knot, the “dots” of lepidopterological spacetime irreducible 
to a simpler “point” in space and time. As we follow the narrative sequence more micro- and 
macrologically at once, with holistic, philopoetic attention to its intricate conceptual cues and 
contextual clues, especially its streaks and energies of “oppositional poetics” envisaged by Anne 
Waldman, for instance, we come to see more clearly the trans-categorical auto-generativity of its 
modal openness, its oddly powerful, non-militarily propelled, avant-garde peripherality. As Zhuangzi’s 
butterfly gets freed this way from the discursive net where it is lost and found (often instantly dead), 
the vocalized figure of the “irritating” narrator, too, will change more freely, flying in and out and back 
in “daoistically” rather than agonistically. 
Such an idea of, say, an idea itself immediately becoming something else is embryonically 
allegorized by the big flying fish with which Zhuangzi (Z 1:1) famously opens. From the start of this 
journey into Zhuangzi’s philopoetics of freedom, we have been accompanied and (mis)guided by that 
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magical and mysteriously approachable figure of transformative immanence and immanent 
transcendence; it is also immediately ridiculed and envied, both rightly, by a cicada and a dove, for 
being uselessly expansive and carefree. Those hard-nosed, sneering pragmatists that would 
counterbalance the perils of lofty idealism with the perks of actual frequent flying are onto something, 
indeed. Especially good at math, these bite-size, down-to-earth, hard-working creatures cheerfully 
volunteer to prove, once and for all, the absurd futility of the very existence of the other, bigger fish-bird, 
which reminds me of those Mandarin metaphysicians from whom Descartes, too, tried to stay away. 
Jolly good. Fair enough. 
Now, turn to this other, next issue: 
The mushroom of a morning does not know (what takes place between) the beginning and 
end of a month; the short-lived cicada does not know (what takes place between) the spring 
and autumn. These are instances of a short term of life. (Z 2:2).	
The joint, hinge, interstice, between and within bodies, individual or collective, nano or jumbo, here 
and there, neither “short” in itself nor “long” in itself but fitting itself anyway, is where transformative 
changes take place and are rendered visible retrospectively. Who, what, can “carry” such? Again, a 
change itself in the middle-muddle. 
Given here is a multifaceted embodiment of the very force of oppositional philopoetics, in itself 
faceless, the third perspective or voice that keeps the other two in check, alive. What remains as a 
generative puzzle or a pressure-point in “enquiring minds”—as Zhuangzi signals with a cinematic, 
opening description (Z 2:1) of Nanguo Ziqi’s peculiar posture “today”, right there, right now—is 
precisely the transitory (non-)identity or transitional (dis)continuity: what is it that connects, i.e., 
perceptually differentiates while accommodating, the body of one, this one, Nanguo Ziqi, that happens 
to “look up to Heaven and breathe gently as if in trance…while leaning forward on the stool…like a 
withered tree” this way, and the body of the putatively same one, Nanguo Ziqi, that has not done or has 
not been seen to be doing that before. The narrative gaze has been there, which, again, does not 
necessarily mean that it remains self-identical. 
Now surely, a cicada, our ancient Chinese pragmatist, would still have to make some noise:  
just what message could we take home? Why bother with this confusion, especially at the  
conclusion? When I cannot really know if I am “waiting for the scales of a snake or the wings of a 
cicada” (Z 2:13), what good is that suspense? At this stage of double-scaled reading as  
layered-suspended thinking, in this split scene of co-agitation twinly supported by the  
epistemo-phenomenology of not-so-knowing-and-knowing-so, I also see a smoke of imagination rising, 
out of the blue, from the Waldman-esque–Margrittean transgenic “dream images such as my shoulder 
being opened like a lid” [34], freeing the dead from my heart, “shoulder to shoulder” [35], welcoming 
a life through another channel…as “I”, Celan, “an eye similar to yours on each finger, probe for a 
place, through which I can wake myself toward you, the bright hungercandle in mouth” [36], writing a 
line or two—to you, to go on. 
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